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1. Introduction 
 
Because the global economy has become increasingly interdependent, thousands of applied 
general equilibrium (AGE) analyses have been conducted to evaluate regional trade 
agreements and economic partnership arrangements, and a number of model builders have 
attempted to incorporate theoretical information on intra-industry trade to account for 
economies of scale and imperfect competition. In conventional AGE models, the so-called 
“Armington assumption” has been widely adopted to handle cross-hauling, which is often 
observed in real data, between developed economies that have similar technologies and 
factor endowments.1 Because this can be regarded to be an ad hoc approach and can cause 
awkward simulation results from its tendency to underestimate efficiency gains, some 
models such as those of Francois and Roland-Holst (1997), Francois (1998), and Roson 
(2006) have introduced theoretical illustrations of product differentiation in their analytical 
models as presented in the pioneering work of Krugman. 
     Krugman (1980) focused on two sources of efficiency gains that result from reducing 
trade barriers: cost reductions brought by economies of scale and increased variety obtained 
through additional imports. In the steady advance of new trade theory that followed, one of 
the most successful extensions of his work was made by Melitz (2003). Melitz appended 
another source of efficiency gains, namely, the reallocation of resources that result from 
endogenous productivity growth among heterogeneous firms. In the AGE research 
community, Zhai (2008) introduced a Melitz-type specification to an AGE model as an 
alternative to the Armington approach. Then, Balistreri and Rutherford (2012) prepared a 
comprehensive guide to the treatment of the three approaches of Armington, Krugman, and 
Melitz. Finally, Dixon and Rimmer (2012) developed a generalized supermodel that 
includes these three types of model as special cases. The supermodel, which is called the 
“Armington-Krugman-Melitz encompassing (AKME) model,” replaces the inter-regional 
trade aspect of a multi-regional AGE model that links gross output in a source region with 
absorption in a destination.2 
     In such situations, Arkolakis, et al. (2012) has shown possibilities that a class of 
heterogeneous and homogeneous firm models may yield the same level of welfare gains 
from trade if those models have the same domestic trade share. In response to their 
argument, Melitz and Redding (2013) have noted that the elasticity of substitution takes 
different values in different specification in the Arkolakis and his colleagues’ “macro” 
                                                     
1 Armington (1969). 
2 When discussing the AKME, we use the term “module” instead of “model.” 
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approach. In the “micro” approach, which has been taken by Melitz and Rodding (2013), 
the models retain the same values for behavioral parameters, and then the heterogeneous 
firm model may generate larger welfare gains from reductions in trade costs. The purpose 
of this paper is to show the strength of the love of variety (LoV) may play a role in the 
midst of those two extreme cases, taking the “micro” approach in calibrating an AKME 
module by assuming that the same value applies to the elasticity of substitution among 
varieties in every specification.3 
     Ardelean (2006) explored how strong the love of variety (LoV) is, and found that 
consumer’s LoV is around 40 percent lower than the one assumed in the Krugman’s model. 
In this paper, we clarify some of the behavioral characteristics of a sample AGE model with 
an AKME module changing the strength of LoV. Simulation experiments reveal that: (1) 
the Melitz-type specification does not always enhance effectiveness of a certain policy 
change more than the one obtained with the Krugman-type, especially when LoV is not so 
strong; (2) there are likely to be points where the volumes of effects obtained with the 
Melitz-type exceed the ones with the Krugman-type; and (3) the preference of the 
producers, those who are in the sectors that exhibit increasing returns to scale (IRTS), for 
traded variety might be the engine of explosive effects as suggested by Fujita, et al. 
(2000:242). 
     The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates a sample 
AGE model with an AKME module, which becomes the base of the analysis. In Section 3, 
we perform simulations with the model which is extended to include an explicit parameter 
to control the strength of LoV, and verify the results. A further extension to make the model 
to be a “sourcing-by-agent” type is applied in Section 4 to identify whose LoV matters most. 
Then, Section 5 presents the paper’s conclusions. 
 
 
2. The Basic Model 
 
In this section, we review details of the basic AGE model with an AKME module used in 
this study. The global economy consists of three regions indexed ݎ  (source) and ݏ 
(destination), which are linked through trade flows. Commodities and activities respectively 
indexed ݅ and ݆ are categorized into three kinds: the primary industries, manufacturing, 
                                                     
3 The “macro” approach is followed by Dixon and his colleagues’ latest research, which verifies whether 
the Melitz model can be regarded as an Armington-type with a high substitution elasticity. Their preliminary 
answer is “Yes.” 
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and services sectors. The manufacturing sector is assumed to be imperfectly competitive 
with IRTS, while the other two are characterized by constant returns to scale (CRTS). The 
primary industries sector uses a sector specific factor, such as land and natural resources, in 
addition to capital, labor, and intermediate goods in its production process. The services 
sector provides a fraction of its output as the inter-regional shipping supply. The 
manufacturing sector is imperfectly competitive when the Melitz- or the Krugman-type 
specification is adopted, while the other two sectors stay perfectly competitive at all times. 
     An important feature of the model is that firms in the manufacturing sector are 
divided into two segments that respectively take charge of production and sales. In the 
production process, the production segment of firms collectively determines sector-wide 
input levels of intermediate goods and primary factors, and the output volume, based on 
CRTS technologies. Then, the product is wholesaled to the sales segment. The sales 
segment consists of many dealers/merchants, those who have market power to determine 
the sales price of the commodity in local markets. The scale economy enters here. 
 
2.1 Production 
 
Composite Commodity for Intermediate Input: First, the unified production segment of 
firms in sector ݆ in region ݎ determines input levels of commodity ݅ for intermediate use 
௜ܺ௝௥ to minimize cost subject to a constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) technology. The 
problem can be expressed as 
 min ∑ ݌௜௥ெ௜ ௜ܺ௝௥ 
 s.t. ෨ܺ௝௥ ൌ ߠ௝௥௑ ቊ∑ ߙ௜௝௥௑௜ ௜ܺ௝௥
ቀఙೕ೉ିଵቁ ఙೕ೉ൗ ቋ
ఙೕ೉ ቀఙೕ೉ିଵቁൗ
  ٣ ݌௝௥௑ , (1) 
where 
 ݌௜௥ெ  is the market price of commodity ݅  in region ݎ , inclusive of export 
duty/subsidy, transportation margin, and import tariff, 
 ݌௝௥௑  is price index for the composite commodity for intermediate input by sector 
݆ in region ݎ, 
 ෨ܺ௝௥ is quantity of composite commodity for intermediate input by sector ݆ in 
region ݎ, 
 ߪ௝௑ is the elasticity of substitution between commodities, 
 ߙ௜௝௥௑  is the share parameter that reflects requirements of commodity ݅ to form 
෨ܺ௝௥, and 
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 ߠ௝௥௑  is the scaling factor of the measuring units.4 
The perpendicular symbol ‘ ٣’ ‘shows the corresponding relationship between variable and 
an equation. The first order condition (FOC) for optimization is 
 ݌௜௥ெ ൌ ߙ௜௝௥௑ ݌௝௥௑ ൫ߠ௝௥௑൯ቀఙೕ
೉ିଵቁ ఙೕ೉ൗ ൬௑෨ೕೝ௑೔ೕೝ൰
ଵ ఙೕ೉⁄
   ٣ ௜ܺ௝௥. (2) 
 
Value-Added: The unified production segment of firms in sector ݆ in region ݎ also 
determines input levels of primary factor ௔ܸ௝௥  to minimize cost subject to a CES 
technology. Three kinds of the primary factor, capital, labor, and the one specific to the 
primary industries, are indexed ܽ. The problem can be expressed as 
 min ∑ ∑ ݓ௔௥௝௔ ௔ܸ௝௥ 
 s.t. ௝ܻ௥ ൌ ߠ௝௥௒ ቊ∑ ߙ௔௝௥௒௔ ௔ܸ௝௥
ቀఙೕೊିଵቁ ఙೕೊൗ ቋ
ఙೕೊ ቀఙೕೊିଵቁൗ
  ٣ ݌௝௥௒ , (3) 
where 
 ݓ௔௥ is rental rate of the primary factor ܽ in region ݎ, 
 ݌௝௥௒  is price index for value-added by sector ݆ in region ݎ, 
 ௝ܻ௥ is value-added by sector ݆ in region ݎ, 
 ߪ௝௒ is the elasticity of substitution between the primary factors, 
 ߙ௔௝௥௒  is the share parameter that reflects requirements of the primary factor ܽ in 
production, and 
 ߠ௝௥௒  is the scaling factor. 
The FOC for optimization is 
 ݓ௔௥ ൌ ߙ௔௝௥௒ ݌௝௥௒ ൫ߠ௝௥௒ ൯ቀఙೕ
ೊିଵቁ ఙೕೊൗ ൬ ௒ೕೝ௏ೌೕೝ൰
ଵ ఙೕೊ⁄
   ٣ ௔ܸ௝௥. (4) 
 
Gross Output: Finally, the unified production segment of firms in sector ݆ in region ݎ 
determine input levels of composite input factors ௝ܻ௥ (value-added) and ෨ܺ௝௥ (composite 
intermediate commodity) to minimize cost subject to a CES technology. The problem can 
be expressed as 
                                                     
4 This parameter is needed to pass the replication test, which verifies whether an AGE model can reproduce 
the state captured by the benchmark data when there is no policy change (the reference run). For example, 
consider the case in which a data set that includes expenditures for two kinds of commodities, 1 and 1, and 
total expenditure 2. If we assume a Cobb-Douglas type function to aggregate these two commodities to make a 
composite good, we need to equate 2 with 1଴.ହ ∙ 1଴.ହ. In this example, the scaling factor ߠ ൌ 2 is required 
to satisfy 2 ൌ ߠ ∙ 1଴.ହ ∙ 1଴.ହ. 
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 min ݌௝௥௒ ௝ܻ௥ ൅ ݌௝௥௑ ෨ܺ௝௥ 
 s.t. ௝ܼ௥ ൌ ߠ௝௥௓ ቊߙ௝௥௓ ௝ܻ௥
ቀఙೕೋିଵቁ ఙೕೋൗ ൅ ൫1 െ ߙ௝௥௓ ൯ ෨ܺ௝௥
ቀఙೕೋିଵቁ ఙೕೋൗ ቋ
ఙೕೋ ቀఙೕೋିଵቁൗ
 
        ٣ ݌௝௥௓ , (5) 
where 
 ݌௝௥௓  is the price index for gross output by sector ݆ in region ݎ, 
 ௝ܼ௥ is gross output by sector ݆ in region ݎ, 
 ߪ௝௓ is the elasticity of substitution between composite input factors, 
 ߙ௝௥௓  is the share parameter that reflects requirements of value-added ௝ܻ௥  to 
produce ௝ܼ௥, and 
 ߠ௝௥௓  is the scaling factor. 
The FOC for optimization is 
 ݌௥௒ ൌ ଵଵାఛೕೝೋ ߙ௝௥
௓ ݌௝௥௓ ൫ߠ௝௥௓ ൯ቀఙೕ
ೋିଵቁ ఙೕೋൗ ൬௓ೕೝ௒ೕೝ൰
ଵ ఙೕೋ⁄
   ٣ ௝ܻ௥, (6) 
and 
 ݌௝௥௑ ൌ ଵଵାఛೕೝೋ ൫1 െ ߙ௝௥
௓ ൯݌௝௥௓ ൫ߠ௝௥௓ ൯ቀఙೕ
ೋିଵቁ ఙೕೋൗ ൬௓ೕೝ௑෨ೕೝ൰
ଵ ఙೕೋ⁄
  ٣ ෨ܺ௝௥, (7) 
where ௝߬௥௓  is the rate of indirect taxes on production. 
 
2.2 Inter-regional Trade: The AKME Module 
 
The inter-regional links between gross outputs in source regions and absorptions in 
destinations are represented by an AKME module based on the supermodel proposed by 
Dixon and Rimmer (2012), which includes the Armington, Krugman, and Melitz models as 
special cases. Although their original model is characterized by the dual approach, we use 
the primal approach to evaluate the model from a different angle. Furthermore, every effort 
has been made to clearly represent the counterpart relationships between the quantity and 
price variables in the equations. Hence, manipulations that may make the counterpart 
relationships unclear, such as substitution to derive a demand function, are avoided as much 
as possible, which leaves the FOCs as they are. 
     The equations that form our AKME module are summarized as follows:5 
                                                     
5 The deriving process of these seven equations is explained in Oyamada (2014). 
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 ∑ ௜ܺ௝௦௝ ൅ ܥ௜௦ ൌ ߠ௜௦் ൜∑ ߜ௜௥௦்௥ ෩ܰ௥௦ܳ௜௥௦൫ఙ೔
೅ିଵ൯ ఙ೔೅ൗ ൠ
ఙ೔೅ ൫ఙ೔೅ିଵ൯ൗ
 ٣ ݌௜௦ெ; (8) 
 ሺ1 ൅ ߬௜௥௦ெ ሻሺ1 ൅ ߬௜௥௦் ሻሺ1 ൅ ߬௜௥௦ா ሻ݌௜௥௦ 
 ൌ ߜ௜௥௦் ሺߠ௜௦்ሻ൫ఙ೔೅ିଵ൯ ఙ೔೅ൗ ݌௜௦ெ ቀ∑ ௑೔ೕೞೕ ା஼೔ೞொ೔ೝೞ ቁ
ଵ ఙ೔೅⁄
   ٣ ܳ௜௥௦; (9) 
 ݌௜௥௦ ൌ ቀ ଵଵାఎቁ
௣೔ೝೢ
ఝೝೞ      ٣ ݌௜௥௦; (10) 
 ∑ ෩ܰ௥௦௦ ொ೔ೝೞఝೝೞ ൅ ߗ௥ ൌ ܼ௜௥ െ ∑ ෩ܰ௥௦௦ ܨ௥௦ െ ௥ܰܪ௥  ٣ ݌௜௥
ௐ; (11) 
 ܩ௥௦ ൌ 1 െ ൬ ఊఊିఙ೔೅ାଵ൰
ఊ ൫ఙ೔೅ିଵ൯⁄ ߮௥௦ିఊ   ٣ ܩ௥௦; (12) 
 ߮௥௦ ൌ ൬ ఊఊିఙ೔೅ାଵ൰
ଵ ൫ఙ೔೅ିଵ൯⁄ ሺିఎሻభ ቀభష഑೔೅ቁൗ
ଵାఎ ቀ
௣೔ೝೢ
௣೔ೝೞቁ
ఙ೔೅ ൫ఙ೔೅ିଵ൯ൗ ቀ ிೝೞொ೔ೝೞቁ
ଵ ൫ఙ೔೅ିଵ൯⁄
 
        ٣ ߮௥௦; (13) 
and 
 ݌௜௥௪൫∑ ෩ܰ௥௦௦ ܨ௥௦ ൅ ௥ܰܪ௥൯ ൌ െߟ ∑ ݌௜௥௦௦ ෩ܰ௥௦ܳ௜௥௦  ٣ ௥ܰ, (14) 
where 
 ܥ௜௦ is the final demand for a commodity in region ݏ, 
 ܳ௜௥௦ is the average trade flow of commodity ݅ sold by active firm in region ݎ 
to region ݏ, 
 ݌௜௥௦ is the differentiated sales price for market ݏ sold by firm in region ݎ 
excluding the transportation margin and the import tariff, 
 ݌௜௥௪ is the wholesale price of the products, 
 ܩ௥௦ ∈ ሺ0,1ሻ is the proportion of registered but inactive firms in region ݎ that 
sell products to region ݏ, 
 ߮௥௦ is the average productivity of active firms, 
 ௥ܰ is the number of firms registered in region ݎ. 
 ෩ܰ௥௦ is the number of active firms that operate in region ݎ and sell products on 
the ݎ-ݏ link, 
 ܨ௥௦ is the fixed cost as measured in units of gross output (composite input) and 
necessary to make sales on the ݎ-ݏ link, 
 ܪ௥ is the fixed cost as measured in units of gross output (composite input) and 
necessary to establish a firm in region ݎ, 
 ߪ௜் ൐ 1  is the elasticity of substitution between the varieties from various 
sources, 
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 ߜ௜௥௦்  is the weight parameter that reflects the preference of region ݏ for the 
region of origin ݎ, 
 ߠ௜௦் is the scaling factor, 
 ߟ is related to the elasticity of substitution ߪ் such that ߟ ≡ െ1 ߪ௜்⁄ , 
 ߛ is a shape parameter related to productivity such that ߛ ൐ ߪ௜் െ 1,6 
 ߬௜௥௦ா  is the rate of export duty/subsidy, 
 ߬௜௥௦்  is the rate of transportation margin, 
 ߬௜௥௦ெ  is the import tariff rate, and 
 ߗ௥ is inter-regional transportation supply defined with a regional share parameter 
߱௥ as 
 ߗ௥ ≡ ఠೝ௣೔ೝೈ ∑ ∑ ∑ ߬௜ᇲ௥ᇲ௦
்௦ ൫1 ൅ ߬௜ᇲ௥ᇲ௦ா ൯݌௜ᇲ௥ᇲ௦ ෩ܰ௥ᇲ௦ܳ௜ᇲ௥ᇲ௦௥ᇲ௜ᇲ . 
ߗ௥ is included in Equation (11) if and only if ݅ is the services sector. Furthermore, the 
second and the third terms in the right-hand side of Equation (11) enter if and only if ݅ is 
the manufacturing sector when we assume the Melitz- and the Krugman-type specifications. 
Similarly, ߟ  and ߮௥௦  enter Equation (10) only when ݅  is the manufacturing sector. 
Equations (12) and (13) do not appear in either a Krugman- or Armington-type 
specification. Equation (14) is also dropped from an Armington–type specification. 
     Then, the module switches the Melitz-, Krugman-, and Armington-type 
specifications by applying different parameter settings as follows. 
 
Melitz-type Specification: In the Melitz-type specification, the following two settings 
apply, in addition to (8) through (14): 
 ߟ ൌ െ ଵఙ೔೅; 
and 
 ෩ܰ௥௦ ൌ ሺ1 െ ܩ௥௦ሻ ௥ܰ. 
 
Krugman-type Specification: In the Krugman-type specification, the following four 
relations apply, in addition to (8) through (11) and (14): 
 ܨ௥௦ ൌ 0; 
 ߟ ൌ െ ଵఙ೔೅; 
                                                     
6 For details, see Balistreri and Rutherford (2012). 
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 ߮௥௦ ൌ 1; 
and 
 ෩ܰ௥௦ ൌ ௥ܰ (∴ ܩ௥௦ ൌ 0). 
 
Armington-type Specification: In the Armington-type specification, the following four 
relations apply, in addition to (8) through (11): 
 ܨ௥௦ ൌ ܪ௥ ൌ 0; 
 ߟ ൌ 0; 
 ߮௥௦ ൌ 1; 
and 
 ෩ܰ௥௦ ൌ ௥ܰ ൌ 1 (∴ ܩ௥௦ ൌ 0). 
 
2.3 Final Demand 
 
Composite Commodity for Final Consumption: Similar to the case of intermediate 
inputs, the representative consumer in region ݏ determines demand levels of commodity ݅ 
for final demand ܥ௜௥  to minimize cost subject to a Cobb-Douglas aggregator.7 The 
problem can be expressed as 
 min ∑ ݌௜௥ெ௜ ܥ௜௥ 
 s.t. ܥሚ௥ ൌ ߠ௥஼ ∏ ܥ௜௥ఈ೔ೝ
಴
௜      ٣ ݌௥஼, (15) 
where 
 ݌௥஼ is price index for the composite commodity for final demand in region ݎ; 
 ܥሚ௥ is quantity of composite commodity for final demand in region ݎ; 
 ߙ௜௥஼  is the share parameter that reflects requirements of commodity ݅ to form 
ܥሚ௥; and 
 ߠ௥஼ is the scaling factor. 
The FOC for optimization is 
 ݌௜௥ெ ൌ ߙ௜௥஼ ݌௥஼ ቀ஼ሚೝ஼೔ೝቁ     ٣ ܥ௜௥. (16) 
 
Welfare: Then, the representative consumer in region ݏ maximizes the level of composite 
final demand ܥሚ௥, which represents his/her welfare level, subject to a budget constraint, 
                                                     
7 Final demand ܥ௜௥ includes fixed capital formation to keep the model simple in this study. 
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given as the total of factor income and tax revenue transferred from the regional authority. 
In this setting, we presume that the current account remains imbalanced at the same 
position given by the benchmark data for simplicity.8 This problem can be expressed as 
follows: 
 max ܥሚ௥ 
 s.t. ݌௥஼ܥሚ௥ ൌ ∑ ∑ ݓ௔௥௝௔ ௔ܸ௝௥ ൅ ௥ܶ ൅ ܵ௥̅ி   ٣ ߣ௥, (17) 
where 
 ߣ௥ is the total change of composite consumption given a unit increase of income; 
 ܵ௥̅ி is foreign savings by region ݎ, which is given exogenously; and 
 ௥ܶ is the tax revenue, defined as 
 ௥ܶ ≡ ∑
ۖە
۔
ۖۓ ఛೕೝೋ
ଵାఛೕೝೋ
݌௝௥ௐ ௝ܼ௥
൅∑ ߬௜௥௦ா௦ ݌௜௥௦ ෩ܰ௥௦ܳ௜௥௦
൅∑ ߬௜௦௥ெ௦ ሺ1 ൅ ߬௜௦௥் ሻሺ1 ൅ ߬௜௦௥ா ሻ݌௜௦௥ ෩ܰ௥௦ܳ௜௦௥ۙۖ
ۘ
ۖۗ
௝ . 
Note that ෩ܰ௥௦ is set to unity when ݅ is not the manufacturing sector, since the primary 
industries and services sectors are assumed to be perfectly competitive so that the 
Armington-type specification is applied. The FOC for optimization is 
 ߣ௥݌௥஼ ൌ 1      ٣ ܥሚ௥. (18) 
 
2.4 Others 
 
Factor Market: The factor market clearing conditions are 
 ∑ ௔ܸ௝௥௝ ൌ തܸ௔௥      ٣ ݓ௔௥, (19) 
where തܸ௔௥ is the exogenously given factor endowment. 
 
A Dual Relation: Finally, a relation between ݌௝௥௓  (price index for gross output) and ݌௝௥ௐ 
(wholesale price) is added: 
 ݌௝௥௓ ൌ ݌௝௥ௐ      ٣ ௝ܼ௥. (20) 
 
     The system of a three-region, three-sector AGE model that includes the AKME 
module based on Dixon and Rimmer (2012) is described by 20 equations consist of (1) 
through (20). Since Walras' Law holds, one of the market clearing conditions automatically 
                                                     
8 The level of position (foreign savings) is valued by the price of numéraire commodity. Foreign savings 
ܵ௥̅ி is defined by the total value of imports at CIF (cost, insurance, and freight) prices minus the total value of 
exports at FOB (free-on-board) prices that includes inter-regional shipping supply. In the present model, net 
factor income from abroad does not exist. 
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holds. In this regard, for example, we drop (11) with respect to the primary industries in the 
third region, exogenously setting the corresponding ݌௜௥ௐ to unity. This implies we treat the 
primary products made in the third region as the numéraire commodity. 
 
 
3. Experiments A 
 
In this section, we report on some results of simulations performed with the three-region, 
three-sector AGE model with the AKME module introduced in the previous section. Before 
we begin, it is necessary to match the theory, on which the analytical model is based, with 
the given benchmark data to parameterize the model. Let us start by making some choices 
that characterize the model. 
 
3.1 Matching Theory with Data 
 
Although the trade specification by Armington (1969) assumed that varieties are 
differentiated by region of origin, the monopolistic competition models presented by 
Krugman (1980) and Melitz (2003) assume that an importer assesses variety expansion 
regardless of its source. As Ardelean (2006) has noted, these imply that an Armington-type 
specification eliminates the variety expansion channel of larger exporters, which fixes the 
number of varieties so that an exporter grows only through the intensive margin, and the 
Krugman- and Melitz-types predict that the rate of variety expansion is proportional to the 
growth in the volume of exports so that an exporter grows only through the extensive 
margin.9 
     In the implementation process of an AGE model, we need to match the theoretical 
features shown above with benchmark data. There are two possible approaches as Hertel 
(2009) has shown. One approach is to assume the existence of unobserved (iceberg) trade 
costs to fill the gap between the observed and calculated trade flows given as a solution by 
an AGE model with a symmetric preference for varieties among exporters in the replication 
test. This approach requires re-estimation of the transportation margins based on a certain 
assumption. The second approach is to include preference weights to capture differentiation 
among regions, such as home bias, as in the Armington-type specifications. 
                                                     
9 There has been a discussion on the relationship between the number of export varieties, volume of export 
quantities, and total value of exports. For instance, Hummels and Klenow (2005) found that the number of 
export varieties explains only 60 percent of the difference in export values across regions. 
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     Zhai (2008) and Balistreri, et al. (2011) have taken the former approach. Zhai (2008) 
derived the unobserved transportation margins on the international trade flows by assuming 
that domestic trade incurs no iceberg trade costs.10 Balistreri, et al. (2011) econometrically 
estimated the whole set of parameters by using a nonlinear structural estimation procedure. 
On the other hand, Balistreri and Rutherford (2012) and Dixon, et al. (2013) have referred 
to the possibilities of the latter approach.11 Balistreri and Rutherford (2012) have explained 
a part of the calibration procedures in both approaches. To pursue a more labor-saving and 
simpler way by making full use of the information that we are familiar with or have 
relatively easy access to, we take the latter approach by assuming the non-existence of 
unobserved trade costs. 
     The most important point is that changes in varieties are fully assessed in the 
importer’s demand aggregator in many studies. It also is the same in the studies by 
Arkolakis, et al. (2012) and Melitz and Redding (2013), which address a debate over the 
welfare gains generated by a class of heterogeneous and homogeneous firm models. If the 
models are calibrated to the same domestic trade share and reduced-form trade elasticity, 
which is called the “macro” approach by Melitz and Redding (2013), the same level of 
welfare gains from trade is obtained. If the models retain the same values for behavioral 
parameters, which is called the “micro” approach, the heterogeneous firm model may 
generate larger welfare gains from reductions in trade costs. Concerning the elasticity of 
substitution among varieties, the strength of importer’s LoV may play a role to connect 
these two extreme cases. Ardelean (2006) explored how strong the LoV is, and found that 
importer’s LoV is around 40 percent lower than the one assumed in the Krugman’s model. 
     Based on the study done by Ardelean (2006), we introduce an additional parameter 
that assesses the influence of LoV. At the same time, we would like to suggest we clearly 
distinguish two different kinds of viewpoint: (a) to what extent, total import values 
including changes in varieties are differentiated with respect to the region of origin; and (b) 
to what extent, the influence of LoV is accounted for in an importer’s demand formation.12 
Then, ߜ௜௥௦்  in Equations (8) and (9) can be defined as 
                                                     
10 Careful consideration is required to apply this assumption when one is going to handle regions instead of 
countries. Assuming that intra-regional trade does not incur iceberg costs, no matter the distances between the 
countries grouped in the same region, might be unrealistic in some cases. 
11 Although the discussion is limited to a Krugman-type, Francois and Roland-Holst (1997) and Francois 
(1998) took the latter approach. 
12 While Ardelean (2006) has shed lights on the intensity of LoV, the import demand still remains 
symmetric across regions. With such formulation, the model may not reproduce the state given by the 
benchmark data in the reference run, especially when the Armington-type is the case. A way to calibrate a 
model to manage the symmetric preference, setting ߙ௜௥௦்  to unity, in a case of the Krugman- or Melitz-type is 
explained later. 
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 ߜ௜௥௦் ≡ ߙ௜௥௦் ෩ܰ௥௦ሺఉೞିଵሻ ఙ೔
೅⁄
,      (21) 
where 
 ߙ௜௥௦்  is the demand share parameter which corresponds to the viewpoint (a); and 
 ߚ௦ ∈ ሾ0,1ሿ is the importer’s LoV which corresponds to the viewpoint (b). 
ߚ  has suffix ݏ  because variety expansion in certain kind of commodity might be 
differentiated by importers. 
     Substituting (21) into Equation (8), the CES demand aggregator for imported 
products from region ݎ is rewritten to 
 ∑ ௜ܺ௝௦௝ ൅ ܥ௜௦ ൌ ߠ௜௦் ൜∑ ߙ௜௥௦் ෩ܰ௥௦൫ఉೞାఙ೔
೅ିଵ൯ ఙ೔೅ൗ௥ ܳ௜௥௦൫ఙ೔
೅ିଵ൯ ఙ೔೅ൗ ൠ
ఙ೔೅ ൫ఙ೔೅ିଵ൯ൗ
. (22) 
Since the volumes of basic preference weights ߙ௜௥௦்  are adjusted in the calibration process 
by the scaling factor ߠ௜௦் to pass the replication test, we assume ∑ ߙ௜௥௦்௥ ൌ 1. 
     At ߚ௦ ൌ 0, Equation (22) is equivalent to the Armington-type and an importer ݏ 
places no value on additional varieties. At ߚ௦ ൌ 1, (22) is consistent with the setting in the 
theoretical models by Krugman (1980) and Melitz (2003), with which an importer ݏ fully 
enjoys variety increase. An important point here is that the CES weights 
ߙ௜௥௦் ෩ܰ௥௦൫ఉೞାఙ೔
೅ିଵ൯ ఙ೔೅ൗ  are now endogenous when ߚ௦ ൐ 0. One of the problems of the 
Armington-type specification pointed out in previous studies is that the CES weights are 
fixed and do not change in the long-run. Contrary, the Krugman- and Melitz-types can 
manage the case an importer endogenously changes his/her valuation of the commodity 
based on certain changes in the economic environment. 
 
3.2 Data and Parameterization of the Model 
 
The model is calibrated to the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) 8.1 database13 for 
2007 along with additional information on the shape parameter related to productivity (ߛ) 
for the Melitz-type specification. 14  The original 129 countries/regions and 57 
commodities/activities are respectively aggregated to three. The regions consist of the 
Asia-Pacific (r01), the North and South Americas (r02), and the European Union and the 
Rest of the World (r03). The three sectors are the primary industries (i01), manufacturing 
                                                     
13 For details, see Hertel (1997). 
14 The choice of number of firms or level of fixed costs will not affect simulation results. Thus, initial levels 
for two types of number of firms, ௥ܰ and ܩ௥௦, or parameter values for two types of fixed costs, ܪ௥ and ܨ௥௦, 
can be set freely to any preferred value. For detailed explanations, see Oyamada (2014). 
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(i02), and services (i03). As noted previously, the manufacturing sector (i02) is assumed to 
be imperfectly competitive with IRTS, while the other two are characterized by CRTS. The 
primary industries sector (i01) uses a sector specific factor, such as land and natural 
resources, in addition to capital, labor, and intermediate goods in its production process. 
The services sector (i03) provides a fraction of its output as the inter-regional shipping 
supply. 
     Estimates for ߛ can be found in several empirical studies, such as Melitz and 
Redding (2013), Balistreri, et al. (2011), and Bernard, et al. (2007). Based on their findings, 
we set ߛ to 5.0. The details of the benchmark data set are summarized in Appendix. The 
calibration step is similar to the ones adopted in traditional AGE models. 
 
3.3 Simulations 
 
The simulation experiments in this section, that reveal some of the behavioral 
characteristics of the model, are categorized into two types. In the first type, we examine 
the effects of trade liberalization on the regional welfare levels switching the three kinds of 
trade specification based on the Armington, Krugman, and Melitz models. In the second 
type, we examine how the results obtained by the first type change when the importer’s 
LoV (ߚ௦) take different values from zero to unity. 
     Trade liberalization is expressed as the permanent removal of trade barriers, such as 
export duty/subsidy and import tariff, levied on the trade flows of manufactured products 
(i02). First, we consider three kinds of trade liberalization scenario: [Scenario I] 
intra-regional free trade agreement (FTA) in the Asia-Pacific region (r01); [Scenario II] 
intra-regional FTA in the North and South Americas (r02); and [Scenario III] intra- and 
inter-regional FTA among the Asia-Pacific (r01) and the North and South Americas (r02). 
In this type of experiment, the values of the importer’s LoV (ߚ௦) for three regions are all set 
to 0.5, when the Krugman- and Melitz-types are applied.15 
     Next, the values of the importer’s LoV (ߚ௦) for the Asia-Pacific (r01) and the North 
and South Americas (r02) are respectively changed from zero to unity, while the value for 
the European Union and the Rest of the World (r03) remains constant, fixed to 0.5. The step 
width of the value changes for r01 and r02 is set to 0.05. It implies that we have 21 values 
of ߚ௦ between zero and unity for one region. Thus, we underwent 441 (21ൈ21) different 
simulations for each of three scenarios. Note that the model is re-calibrated for every values 
                                                     
15 When the Armington-type specification is utilized, ߚ௦ for all regions are set to zero by definition. 
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of ߚ௦ to purify the effects of trade liberalization and make it comparable to each other. If 
we change the value of ߚ௦ after the model is calibrated, the modification itself alters the 
economic environment and affects the state of the global economy (an equilibrium), even 
when no trade liberalization takes place. The effects of changing the value of ߚ௦ should be 
clearly distinguished and split from those of trade liberalization, and swept out from the 
experiments. 
 
3.3.1 Welfare Effects of Trade Liberalization under Alternative Trade 
Specifications 
 
Let us start with examining the effects of trade liberalization on the regional welfare levels 
switching the three kinds of trade specification respectively based on the Armington, 
Krugman, and Melitz models. As noted above, the following three kinds of trade 
liberalization scenario are considered: [Scenario I] intra-regional FTA in the Asia-Pacific 
region (r01); [Scenario II] intra-regional FTA in the North and South Americas (r02); and 
[Scenario III] intra- and inter-regional FTA among r01 and r02. The values of the importer’s 
LoV (ߚ௦) for three regions are all fixed to 0.5 when the Melitz- and Krugman-type 
specifications apply. 
     Table 1 shows the Hicksian equivalent variations (EV) in billions U.S. dollars when 
the Asia-Pacific region (r01) fully liberalizes trade in manufactured products (i02) within 
the region (Scenario I). It is expressed by setting ߬"௜଴ଶ""௥଴ଵ""௥଴ଵ"ெ ൌ ߬"௜଴ଶ""௥଴ଵ""௥଴ଵ"ா ൌ 0 in 
the model. The intra-regional trade liberalization concerning i02 in r01 may bring large 
welfare gains only to r01, and has negative effects on the welfare levels of outsiders. When 
the Melitz- and Krugman-type specifications apply, the welfare gains of r01 are more than 
ten times greater than the case of the Armington-type. It is the expansion effects brought by 
endogenous changes of the CES weights in the demand aggregator for imported products. 
Even when ߚ௦ is fixed to 0.5, the expansion effects become this large. 
     While the trade diversion effects for r02 is larger than the ones for r03 when the 
Armington-type apply, the relation is reversed in the cases of the Melitz- and 
Krugman-types and the loss of r03 turns to be much large than r02. For this, trade patterns 
in the base case as well as the preference on the source region of a commodity are playing 
roles. Once r01 liberalizes the intra-regional trade, expansion effects through an increase of 
the preference weight for the domestic products accrue. Thus, both r02 and r03 lose 
opportunities to trade with r01, and as a result, those regions increase trade with each other. 
The import values of i02 by r02 at the cost, freight, and insurance (CIF) prices in the base 
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case are 898 billion and 572 billion U.S. dollars from r01 and r03, respectively, and the 
imports by r03 are 1015 billion and 457 billion from r01 and r02, respectively. Assuming 
that r02 and r03 respectively lose trade opportunities with r01 at the same level, r03 loses 
more favorable opportunities (the value of ߙ௜௥௦்  is larger) with r01 and has to increase trade 
with more unfavorable partner r02 (the value of ߙ௜௥௦்  is smaller), compared to r02. This is 
the reason why the loss of r03 is greater than the one of r02. 
     In a similar manner, Table 2 shows EV in billions U.S. dollars when the North and 
South Americas (r02) fully liberalizes trade in i02 within the region (Scenario II). As in the 
previous scenario, this case is expressed by setting ߬"௜଴ଶ""௥଴ଶ""௥଴ଶ"ெ ൌ ߬"௜଴ଶ""௥଴ଶ""௥଴ଶ"ா ൌ 0 
in the model. In this scenario, the welfare gains of r02 are much smaller than the previous 
scenario in all of the trade specifications. In addition, levels of the expansion effects in the 
Melitz- and Krugman-types also are shrinking. It is because, the initial import tariff rate 
levied on the intra-regional trade of i02 is lower in r02 (0.170%) than in r01 (0.679%). 
Elimination of a larger distortion may bring greater welfare effects. 
     Table 3 is for the case when r01 and r02 settle intra- and inter-regional FTA (Scenario 
III). It is expressed by setting ߬"௜଴ଶ""௥଴ଵ""௥଴ଵ"ெ ൌ ߬"௜଴ଶ""௥଴ଶ""௥଴ଶ"ெ ൌ ߬"௜଴ଶ""௥଴ଵ""௥଴ଶ"ெ ൌ
߬"௜଴ଶ""௥଴ଶ""௥଴ଵ"ெ ൌ ߬"௜଴ଶ""௥଴ଵ""௥଴ଵ"ா ൌ ߬"௜଴ଶ""௥଴ଶ""௥଴ଶ"ா ൌ ߬"௜଴ଶ""௥଴ଵ""௥଴ଶ"ா ൌ ߬"௜଴ଶ""௥଴ଶ""௥଴ଵ"ா ൌ 0 . 
In this case, r03 who is excluded from the FTA becomes the sole loser, while the member 
regions of the FTA are better off. 
     Similar to the first scenario, the welfare gains of r01 in the cases of the Melitz- and 
Krugman-type specifications become more than ten times greater than the one obtained in 
the Armington-type. On the other hand, the expansion effects brought by endogenous 
changes of the preference weights are not so large for r02. However, if we focus on the 
inter-regional part of the trade liberalization, the gains of r02 are much greater than the ones 
of r01. From the second scenario, the welfare gains of r02 become 2.5 times larger, while 
the gains of r01 are 1.5 times larger than the ones in the first scenario. Especially, when the 
Armington-type specification applies, the gains of r02 exceed those of r01. In this meaning, 
inter-regional trade liberalization between r01 and r02 is more favorable for r02. 
     Let us start verifying the case of the Armington-type first. The initial import tariff rate 
levied by r01 on the i02 commodities produced in r02 is 4.078%, and the one by r02 on the 
r01 products is 3.651%. When those barriers are abolished, we expect the increase of 
exports by r02 is greater than that by r01. Then, recall that the current account is assumed to 
remain imbalanced at the same position given by the benchmark data in the simulations. To 
increase exports, the volumes of imports have to be expanded. In addition, other kinds of 
commodity, i01 and i03, also are traded. The combinations of such effects determine the 
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final state of terms of trade, and as a result, the gains of r02 exceed the ones of r01. 
     Why is this relation reversed when the Melitz- and Krugman-types apply? Previously, 
we saw that the initial import tariff rates levied on the intra-regional trade of i02 in r01 and 
r02 are 0.679% and 0.170%, respectively. Since the effects from liberalizing intra-regional 
trade might be stronger in r01 than in r02, there is a possibility that the expansion effects 
brought by increases of the preference weight for domestic products cancel those for the 
r02 products out in r01. Again, the preference weight ߙ௜௥௦்  plays an important role. In 
many cases, the proportion of intra-regional trade that includes domestic trade is larger than 
those of inter-regional trade. Then, it is likely that economic agents in every region may 
place more importance for domestic and intra-regional trade than inter-regional trade. 
Hence, the expansion effects accrued in the models with imperfect competition become 
stronger to intra-regional trade, and suppress the welfare gains of r02 observed in the 
Armington-type specification. 
     Finally, let us see the differences brought by changing trade specifications. Generally 
speaking, the introduction of imperfect competition into the manufacturing sector (i02) 
largely inflates gains by the participants of FTAs, while decreases gains or increases losses 
by the outsiders, as expected. For r01 in Scenarios I and III, the gains become more than ten 
times larger than the one obtained with the Armington-type. On the other hand, notice that 
the Krugman-type specification tends to provide larger gains for the members of FTAs than 
the Melitz-type, unexpectedly, except r02 in Scenario II. The reason why these happen can 
be found in the setting of the strength of LoV (ߚ௦). Hence, we forward to see the effects of 
changing the values of ߚ௦ on these simulations results. 
 
3.3.2 Effects of Changing the Strength of LoV on the Simulation Results 
 
In this experiment, we will see how the results obtained previously, assuming the Melitz- 
and Krugman-type trade specifications, change with different values of the importer’s LoV 
(ߚ௦) for the manufactured products (i02), given for the Asia-Pacific (r01) and the North and 
South Americas (r02). The values of ߚ௦ for the two regions are respectively changed from 
zero to unity, with the step width of 0.05, while the value for the European Union and the 
Rest of the World (r03) is fixed to 0.5.16 As noted above, the model is re-calibrated for 
every values of ߚ௦ to eliminate the effects of changing the value of ߚ௦, which may 
                                                     
16 Note that the results obtained setting ߚ௦ ൌ 0 for both r01 and r02 differ from the ones obtained 
assuming the Armington-type trade specification, which are shown in the bottom rows of Tables 1 through 3, 
because in the former case the value of ߚ௦ for r03 is 0.5 while the corresponding value is zero in the latter 
case. 
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permeate in the effects of trade liberalization if we change it after the model is calibrated. 
Hence, we have 441 independent models for each of three scenarios. Since the three 
dimensional figures that includes all the 441 cases look too much complicated, we present, 
in this section, two dimensional figures that capture changes in the regional welfare when 
the values of ߚ௦ for both r01 and r02 simultaneously shift from zero to unity. 
     Figures 1 through 3 depict the effects of changing the value of ߚ௦ on the regional 
welfare levels with the Melitz- and Krugman-type specifications. Three figures respectively 
correspond to the three trade liberalization scenarios: [Figure 1] intra-regional FTA in the 
Asia-Pacific region (r01); [Figure 2] intra-regional FTA in the North and South Americas 
(r02); and [Figure 3] intra- and inter-regional FTA among r01and r02. In each set, three 
figures from the top to the bottom capture the effects for r01 through r03. It can be regarded 
that the picture on the top of Figure 1 (let us call it Figure 1T), the one in the middle of 
Figure 2 (3M), and the ones on the top and middle of Figure 3 (3T and 3M), are showing 
the effects when the corresponding region is liberalizing trade. On the other hand, the rest 
of the pictures, the ones in the middle and bottom of Figure 1 (1M and 1B), the ones on the 
top and bottom of Figure 2 (2T and 2B), and the one on the bottom of Figure 3 (3B), are all 
corresponding to the cases when the captured region is excluded from the FTAs. 
     From Figures 1T, 2M, 3T, and 3M, it can be said that stronger LoV improves the 
welfare levels of the regions that settle free trade. On the other hand, the regions outside a 
FTA tend to be worse off. One exception is found in Figure 1M. When LoV is weak, the 
intra-regional FTA in r01 has trade creation effects, which bring positive spillovers to r02. 
This might be related to the discussion we made previously on the welfare gains of r02 in 
Scenario III when the Armington-type specification applies. As the strength of LoV 
becomes weaker, the expansion effects brought by changes of CES weights vanish. Then, 
the trade creation effects, which the intra-regional FTA in r01 basically has, are getting 
obvious. 
     Another characteristic shown in the figures is that the welfare effects tend to be 
inflated as the value of ߚ௦ gets larger and closer to unity. For instance, the difference 
between the welfare levels that correspond to ߚ௦ ൌ 0 and ߚ௦ ൌ 1 are more than fifteen 
times for r01 in Scenario I (Figure 1T) and about ten times for r02 in Scenario II (Figure 
2M), respectively. The negative impacts to the regions excluded from a FTA also magnify. 
One interesting point is that there are reversals in the welfare effects respectively obtained 
with the Melitz- and Krugman-type specifications. When LoV is weak, the effects obtained 
with the Krugman-type tend to be larger, while the effects with the Melitz-type exceed 
those with the Krugman-type when LoV is strong. Recall the question why the 
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Krugman-type specification tends to provide larger gains for the members of FTAs than the 
Melitz-type as shown in Tables 1 through 3, which we placed in the last part of the previous 
subsection. The answer is here. 
     From Figures 1 through 3, the following behavioral characteristics are found: (i) 
when the values of ߚ௦ for r01 and r02 are small and close to zero, effects (deviations from 
the initial values) obtained with the Melitz-type specification tend to be smaller than the 
one with the Krugman-type except the case for r02 in Figure 1; (ii) when the values of ߚ௦ 
for r01 and r02 are large and close to unity, effects with the Melitz-type tend to be much 
larger than the one with the Krugman-type except the case for r02 in Figure 3; and (iii) 
since the non-linearity is stronger in the model with the Melitz-type in many cases, the 
Melitz-type specification may not always enhance effectiveness of a certain policy change 
more than the one obtained with the Krugman-type, especially when the importer’s LoV is 
not so strong. There are likely to be points, around ߚ௦ ൌ 0.5, where the volumes of effects 
obtained with the Melitz-type exceed the ones with the Krugman-type. What fill the 
differences between the results obtained with the Melitz- and the Krugman-type 
specifications are the effects on the reallocation of resources resulting from endogenous 
productivity growth among heterogeneous firms that enters the Melitz-type model. Thus, 
we need further researches on the strength of the importer’s LoV. 
 
 
4. Experiments B 
 
In the three-region three-sector AGE model with the AKME module, which is utilized in 
the previous section, trade flows from source regions are aggregated at the border, and then, 
the composite commodity ݅ is sold on a local market, as expressed by Equation (8). In this 
section, we extend the model from the “sourcing-at-border (SaB)” type to be a 
“sourcing-by-agent (SbA)” type, and verify effects of changing the strength of LoV by 
economic agent, i.e. the unified producers in every sector and the representative consumer, 
to identify whose LoV matters most. In a SbA-type model, trade flows from source regions 
are sold on a local market first, and then every economic agent aggregates the commodities 
to be a ݅-th composite with his/her own preference for traded variety. In this case, ߚ has 
suffix ݆ in addition to ݏ. 
 
4.1 Extending the Model from a “Sourcing-at-Border” Type to be a 
“Sourcing-by-Agent” Type 
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To extend the previously introduced SaB-type model to be a SbA-type, Equation (22) is 
divided into two respectively related to ௜ܺ௝௦ and ܥ௜௦: 
 ௜ܺ௝௦ ൌ ߠ௜௝௦௑ ൜∑ ߙ௜௝௥௦௑ ෩ܰ௥௦ቀఉೕೞ
೉ାఙ೔೅ିଵቁ ఙ೔೅ൗ௥ ൫ܳ௜௝௥௦௑ ൯൫ఙ೔
೅ିଵ൯ ఙ೔೅ൗ ൠ
ఙ೔೅ ൫ఙ೔೅ିଵ൯ൗ
 
        ٣ ݌௜௝௦ெ௑; (23) 
 and 
 ܥ௜௦ ൌ ߠ௜௦஼ ൜∑ ߙ௜௥௦஼ ෩ܰ௥௦൫ఉೞ
಴ାఙ೔೅ିଵ൯ ఙ೔೅ൗ௥ ൫ܳ௜௥௦஼ ൯൫ఙ೔
೅ିଵ൯ ఙ೔೅ൗ ൠ
ఙ೔೅ ൫ఙ೔೅ିଵ൯ൗ
 
        ٣ ݌௜௦ெ஼, (24) 
where 
 ܳ௜௝௥௦௑  is the average trade flow of commodity ݅ sold by active firm in region ݎ 
to the producer ݆ in region ݏ, 
 ܳ௜௥௦஼  is the average trade flow of commodity ݅ sold by active firm in region ݎ 
to the representative consumer in region ݏ, 
 ݌௜௝௦ெ௑ is the market price of commodity ݅ sold to the producer ݆ in region ݏ, 
inclusive of export duty/subsidy, transportation margin, and import tariff, 
 ݌௜௦ெ஼ is the market price of commodity ݅ sold to the representative consumer in 
region ݏ, inclusive of export duty/subsidy, transportation margin, and import 
tariff, 
 ߙ௜௝௥௦௑  is the demand share parameter that reflects the preference of the producer ݆ 
in region ݏ for the commodity ݅ produced in region ݎ, 
 ߙ௜௥௦஼  is the demand share parameter that reflects the preference of the 
representative consumer in region ݏ for the commodity ݅ produced in region ݎ, 
 ߚ௝௦௑ ∈ ሾ0,1ሿ is the LoV by the producer ݆ in region ݏ, 
 ߚ௦஼ ∈ ሾ0,1ሿ is the LoV by the representative consumer in region ݏ, and  
 ߠ௜௝௦௑  and ߠ௜௝஼  are the scaling factors. 
Then, Equation (9) also is divided into two as follows: 
 ൫1 ൅ ߬௜௝௥௦ெ௑ ൯൫1 ൅ ߬௜௝௥௦்௑ ൯൫1 ൅ ߬௜௝௥௦ா௑ ൯݌௜௥௦ 
 ൌ ߙ௜௝௥௦௑ ൫ߠ௜௝௦௑ ൯൫ఙ೔
೅ିଵ൯ ఙ೔೅ൗ ෩ܰ௥௦ቀఉೕೞ
೉ିଵቁ ఙ೔೅ൗ ݌௜௝௦ெ௑ ൬ ௑೔ೕೞொ೔ೕೝೞ೉ ൰
ଵ ఙ೔೅⁄
  ٣ ܳ௜௝௥௦௑ ; (25) 
 and 
 ൫1 ൅ ߬௜௥௦ெ஼൯൫1 ൅ ߬௜௥௦்஼൯൫1 ൅ ߬௜௥௦ா஼൯݌௜௥௦ 
 ൌ ߙ௜௥௦஼ ൫ߠ௜௦஼ ൯൫ఙ೔
೅ିଵ൯ ఙ೔೅ൗ ෩ܰ௥௦൫ఉೞ
಴ିଵ൯ ఙ೔೅ൗ ݌௜௦ெ஼ ൬ ஼೔ೞொ೔ೝೞ಴ ൰
ଵ ఙ೔೅⁄
  ٣ ܳ௜௥௦஼ , (26) 
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where 
 ߬௜௝௥௦ா௑  and ߬௜௥௦ா஼  are the rates of export duty/subsidy, 
 ߬௜௝௥௦்௑  and ߬௜௥௦்஼  are the rates of transportation margin, and 
 ߬௜௝௥௦ெ௑  and ߬௜௥௦ெ஼ are the import tariff rates. 
Finally, small modifications are added to Equations (11), (13), and (14): 
 ∑ ෩ܰ௥௦௦ ∑ ொ೔ೕೝೞ
೉ೕ ାொ೔ೝೞ಴
ఝೝೞ ൅ ߗ௥ ൌ ܼ௜௥ െ ∑ ෩ܰ௥௦௦ ܨ௥௦ െ ௥ܰܪ௥  ٣ ݌௜௥
ௐ; (27) 
 ߮௥௦ ൌ ൬ ఊఊିఙ೔೅ାଵ൰
ଵ ൫ఙ೔೅ିଵ൯⁄ ሺିఎሻభ ቀభష഑೔೅ቁൗ
ଵାఎ ቀ
௣೔ೝೢ
௣೔ೝೞቁ
ఙ೔೅ ൫ఙ೔೅ିଵ൯ൗ ൬ ிೝೞ∑ ொ೔ೕೝೞ೉ೕ ାொ೔ೝೞ಴ ൰
ଵ ൫ఙ೔೅ିଵ൯⁄
 
        ٣ ߮௥௦; (28) 
and 
 ݌௜௥௪൫∑ ෩ܰ௥௦௦ ܨ௥௦ ൅ ௥ܰܪ௥൯ ൌ െߟ ∑ ݌௜௥௦௦ ෩ܰ௥௦൫∑ ܳ௜௝௥௦௑௝ ൅ ܳ௜௥௦஼ ൯ ٣ ௥ܰ. (29) 
     To calibrate a SbA-type model, a global input-output (I-O) table has been compiled 
based on the GTAP 8.1 database for 2007. 17  Neither additional information nor 
re-balancing is required. The import matrices for national I-O tables, “VIFM”, ”VIPM”, 
and ”VIGM”, are chopped utilizing the proportions with respect to the source region 
derived from the trade flows at CIF prices inclusive of transportation margin and import 
tariff, “VIMS”. Then, the I-O tables for domestic products, “VDFM”, ”VDPM”, 
and ”VDGM” are added to the intra-regional part of the extended import matrices. In this 
case, the rates of transportation margin and import tariff with respect to the intra-regional 
trade differ among production sectors and final demand. The global I-O used in this study is 
shown in Appendix. 
 
4.2 Simulations 
 
The experiments in this section simulate the same scenarios considered in the previous 
section. Trade liberalization is expressed as the permanent removal of trade barriers, such as 
export duty/subsidy and import tariff, levied on the trade flows of manufactured products 
(i02). The scenarios are [Scenario I] intra-regional free trade agreement (FTA) in the 
Asia-Pacific region (r01), [Scenario II] intra-regional FTA in the North and South Americas 
(r02), and [Scenario III] intra- and inter-regional FTA among the Asia-Pacific (r01) and the 
North and South Americas (r02). Then, the values of the economic agents’ LoV (ߚ௝௦௑  and 
ߚ௦஼) for the Asia-Pacific (r01) and the North and South Americas (r02) are respectively 
                                                     
17 For the development of GTAP-based multi-region, I-O tables, Walmsley, et al. (2013) provides useful 
information. 
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changed from zero to unity, while the value for the European Union and the Rest of the 
World (r03) remains constant, fixed to 0.5, as in the previous case. 
     Figures 4 through 6 depict the effects of changing the value of ߚ௦஼ , which 
corresponds to the LoV of the representative consumer in r01 and r02, on the regional 
welfare levels with the Melitz- and Krugman-type specifications. In these cases, 
non-linearity of the effects with the Melitz-type is lost, and volumes of the impacts are 
suppressed. In addition, differences between Melitz- and Krugman-type specifications 
shown in Figures 4T and 5M are quite small. In these cases, the effects on the reallocation 
of resources resulting from endogenous productivity growth among heterogeneous firms 
are not working very much. Finally, one may notice that the positive effects with the 
Melitz-type observed in Figure 6M is now smaller than those with the Krugman-type when 
the values of ߚ௦஼ is large. This is reflected in the previously verified Figure 3M, in which 
the reversal in the welfare effects did not happen. Let us compare these results with the 
ones changing ߚ௝௦௑ , which corresponds to the LoV of the unified producers in r01 and r02. 
     Figures 7 through 9 show the effects of changing the value of ߚ௝௦௑ . The figures are 
much similar to the ones we checked in the previous section, while volumes of the effects 
are slightly suppressed. It is because the volumes of intermediate demand for commodity 
i02 are respectively 298.23%, 149.24%, and 159.04% of final demand respectively in r01 
through r03. This time, the effects of the intra- and inter-regional FTA among r01 and r02 
on the welfare level of r02 with the Melitz-type exceed the effects with the Krugman-type 
when LoV is strong (Figure 9M). 
     Whose LoV matters most? Figures 10 through 12, 13 through 15, and 16 through 18 
respectively show the effects of changing the value of ߚ"௜଴ଵ"௦௑ , ߚ"௜଴ଶ"௦௑ , and ߚ"௜଴ଷ"௦௑  for r01 
and r02 from zero to unity on the regional welfare levels. The LoV of the unified producers 
in sector i01 does not matter very much, and the effect reversals also are not observed. The 
reason might be found in the shares of intermediate demand for commodity i02 by sector 
i01, which are 3.39%, 3.57%, and 3.82% in regions r01, r02, and r03. The most influential 
agent is the unified producers in sector i02. Figures 13 through 15 respectively look very 
similar to Figures 7 through 9, which resemble Figures 1 through 3. The shares of 
intermediate demand for commodity i03 by sector i02 are 69.31%, 56.50%, and 59.30% in 
regions r01, r02, and r03. The effects of changing the strength of LoV corresponding to the 
unified producers in sector i03, whose shares in total intermediate demand for commodity 
i02 are 27.30%, 39.92%, and 36.89% respectively in regions r01, r02, and r03, are just 
similar to the ones corresponding to the representative consumers’ LoV, which are captured 
by Figures 4 through 6. 
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     A point is that the effects of changing the strength of LoV corresponding to the 
unified producers in sectors i01 and i03, and the representative consumer do not show 
strong non-linearity. While we need further investigation, efficiency gains from the 
reallocation of resources resulting from endogenous productivity growth among 
heterogeneous firms, which are featured in the Melitz model, might be boosted through the 
intermediate inputs by the IRTS sector. It is the forward linkage suggested by Fujita, et al. 
(2000:242) based on their analysis using a model with intermediate goods. 
     By the simulations with a SbA-type AGE model with AKME module, the following 
behavioral characteristics are found: (iv) based on the demand shares in local markets, the 
volumes of the expansion effects brought by endogenous changes of the preference weights 
on welfare gains from trade liberalization are determined; (v) efficiency gains from the 
reallocation of resources resulting from endogenous productivity growth among 
heterogeneous firms, which are featured in the Melitz model, are not obvious when the 
preference for traded variety is not so strong; and (vi) the preference of the producers, those 
who are in the IRTS sector, for variety might be the engine of explosive effects because it 
creates the forward linkage suggested by Fujita, et al. (2000:242). 
 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
Comparing simulation results obtained by AGE models based on the intra-industry trade 
specifications presented by Armington (1969), Krugman (1980), and Melitz (2003) may 
have considerable importance in evaluating trade-related economic policies today. This 
paper explored how simulation results change with different choice of trade specification, 
and the strength of preference for traded variety by economic agent differs. Simulations 
with the two types of three-region, three-sector AGE model that includes the AKME 
module based on Dixon and Rimmer (2012) revealed some of the behavioral characteristics 
of the model. With the special focus on the strength of the importer’s preference for traded 
variety, the key findings can be summarized as follows: 
 
1. The introduction of imperfect competition into the manufacturing sector (i02) 
largely inflates the effects of trade liberalization. Stronger preference for traded 
variety may contribute to further expansions of the effects; 
 
2. The Melitz-type trade specification may not always enhance effectiveness of a 
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certain policy change more than the one obtained with the Krugman-type, 
especially when the importer’s preference for traded variety is not so strong. There 
are likely to be points where the volumes of effects obtained with the Melitz-type 
exceed the ones with the Krugman-type; 
 
3. Based on the demand shares in local markets, the volumes of the expansion effects 
brought by endogenous changes of the preference weights on welfare gains from 
trade liberalization are determined; 
 
4. Efficiency gains from the reallocation of resources resulting from endogenous 
productivity growth among heterogeneous firms, which are featured in the Melitz 
model, are not substantial when the preference for traded variety is not so strong; 
and 
 
5. The preference of producers, those who are in the IRTS sector, for traded variety 
might be the engine of explosive effects as suggested by Fujita, et al. (2000:242). 
 
     We believe further researches on the strength of economic agents’ preference for 
traded variety enrich the discussions among trade models, and bridge the two extreme cases 
presented by Arkolakis, et al. (2012) and Melitz and Redding (2013). Our next goal is to 
develop an extension module in the GEMPACK (General Equilibrium Modeling 
PACKage)18 format for the GTAP models to make comprehensive trade analysis more 
accessible. 
  
                                                     
18 Harrison and Paerson (1996). 
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Table 1. Hicksian Equivalent Variations (US$ Billion) - Intra-regional FTA in r01 
  r01 r02 r03 
Melitz 65.150 (0.532%) -0.188 (0.001%) -7.855 (-0.036%) 
Krugman 65.178 (0.532%) -0.412 (0.002%) -7.897 (-0.037%) 
Armington 6.478 (0.053%) -0.961 (0.005%) -0.525 (-0.002%) 
Note: ߚ௦ ൌ 0.5 for all s. 
 
 
Table 2. Hicksian Equivalent Variations (US$ Billion) - Intra-regional FTA in r02 
  r01 r02 r03 
Melitz -2.012 (-0.016%) 10.346 (0.053%) -1.776 (-0.008%) 
Krugman -2.027 (-0.017%) 10.317 (0.053%) -1.769 (-0.008%) 
Armington -0.019 (-0.008%) 2.270 (0.012%) -0.586 (-0.003%) 
Note: ߚ௦ ൌ 0.5 for all s. 
 
 
Table 3. Hicksian Equivalent Variations (US$ Billion) - Intra- and Inter-regional FTA 
among r01 and r02 
  r01 r02 r03 
Melitz 99.587 (0.813%) 25.178 (0.129%) -18.099 (-0.084%) 
Krugman 99.605 (0.813%) 25.972 (0.133%) -18.312 (-0.085%) 
Armington 9.825 (0.080%) 17.115 (0.088%) -4.050 (-0.019%) 
Note: ߚ௦ ൌ 0.5 for all s. 
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Figure 1. Change in Welfare (%) - Intra-regional FTA in r01 (All Agents) 
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Figure 2. Change in Welfare (%) - Intra-regional FTA in r02 (All Agents) 
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Figure 3. Change in Welfare (%) - Intra- and Inter-regional FTA among r01 and r02 
(All Agents) 
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Figure 4. Change in Welfare (%) - Intra-regional FTA in r01 (Final Demand) 
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Figure 5. Change in Welfare (%) - Intra-regional FTA in r02 (Final Demand) 
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Figure 6. Change in Welfare (%) - Intra- and Inter-regional FTA among r01 and r02 
(Final Demand) 
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Figure 7. Change in Welfare (%) - Intra-regional FTA in r01 (All Intermediate) 
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Figure 8. Change in Welfare (%) - Intra-regional FTA in r02 (All Intermediate) 
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Figure 9. Change in Welfare (%) - Intra- and Inter-regional FTA among r01 and r02 
(All Intermediate) 
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Figure 10. Change in Welfare (%) - Intra-regional FTA in r01 (Intermediate i01) 
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Figure 11. Change in Welfare (%) - Intra-regional FTA in r02 (Intermediate i01) 
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Figure 12. Change in Welfare (%) - Intra- and Inter-regional FTA among r01 and r02 
(Intermediate i01) 
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Figure 13. Change in Welfare (%) - Intra-regional FTA in r01 (Intermediate i02) 
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Figure 14. Change in Welfare (%) - Intra-regional FTA in r02 (Intermediate i02) 
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Figure 15. Change in Welfare (%) - Intra- and Inter-regional FTA among r01 and r02 
(Intermediate i02) 
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Figure 16. Change in Welfare (%) - Intra-regional FTA in r01 (Intermediate i03) 
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Figure 17. Change in Welfare (%) - Intra-regional FTA in r02 (Intermediate i03) 
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Figure 18. Change in Welfare (%) - Intra- and Inter-regional FTA among r01 and r02 
(Intermediate i03) 
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Appendix. Benchmark Data for the Three-Region Three-Sector Model 
 
The benchmark data set for the three-region, three-sector AGE model that includes the 
AKME module introduced and used in this study consists of I-O tables for three regions 
(Table A1), trade flow tables at four different price levels (Tables A2 through A5), which 
are used to derive ߬௜௥௦ெ , ߬௜௥௦் , and ߬௜௥௦ா , values of inter-regional shipping supply (Table A6), 
four types of substitution elasticities ߪ௝௓, ߪ௝௒, ߪ௝௑, and ߪ௜்  (Table A7), the proportion of 
inactive firms on the intra-regional link ܩ௥௦ሺ௥ୀ௦ሻ (Table A8), the shape parameter ߛ and 
the extensive margin ߝ  (Table A9), and the importer’s LoV ߚ௦ . Although there is 
essentially no positive meaning to derive ܩ௥௦ሺ௥ஷ௦ሻ using values for ܩ௥௦ሺ௥ୀ௦ሻ and ߝ, we 
demonstrate the practice for example based on the following equation: 
 ൜൫ଵାఛೝೞሺೝಯೞሻ൯்ிೝೞሺೝಯೞሻ൫ଵାఛೝೞሺೝసೞሻ൯்ிೝೞሺೝసೞሻൠ
ఌ
ൌ ଵିீೝೞሺೝಯೞሻଵିீೝೞሺೝసೞሻ. 
     The former three are obtained from the GTAP 8.1 database for 2007, and used to 
construct social accounting matrices (SAMs) for three regions (Table A10). As noted in 
Section 3, the original 129 countries/regions and 57 commodities/activities are respectively 
aggregated to three. The regions consist of the Asia-Pacific (r01), the North and South 
Americas (r02), and the European Union and the Rest of the World (r03), and the three 
sectors are the primary industries (i01), manufacturing (i02), and services (i03). The 
primary production factors also are aggregated into three: capital (a01); labor (a02); and 
land and natural resources (a03). Since the data aggregated by GTAPAgg contains minor 
rounding errors, which makes I-O tables imbalanced, the discrepancies caused by such 
errors are all absorbed by the final demand part. 
     The rest are just assumed by the author. Some of the substitution elasticities are 
determined based on the information provided by GTAP database. For the proportion of 
inactive firms on the intra-regional link ܩ௥௦ሺ௥ୀ௦ሻ and the extensive margin ߝ, we chose the 
same values as Zhai (2008) assumed. The shape parameter ߛ is determined based on the 
empirical studies such as done by Balistreli et al. (2011). The values of ߚ௦ are just selected 
from zero to unity. 
     In the tables, AT0x and CT0x also are production sectors. C, E, M, Z, TZ, VA0x, FM, 
HH, WT, and IS respectively denote final demand, exports, imports, gross output, indirect 
taxes on production, primary factors, producers, the representative consumer, 
exports/imports, and inter-regional shipping. 
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Table A1. Input-Output Tables for Each Region (US$ Billion) 
 
r01 i01 i02 i03 C E-M Z 
i01 202.512 1525.609 267.368 490.699 -556.963 1929.225
i02 311.001 6363.255 2506.497 3078.391 669.349 12928.492
i03 243.280 2001.736 4237.989 8687.287 204.420 15374.712
a01 344.683 1312.111 3664.479
a02 562.766 1372.319 4035.730    
a03 450.048    
TZ -185.066 353.461 662.650
Z 1929.225 12928.492 15374.712
 
r02 i01 i02 i03 C E-M Z 
i01 103.680 1036.017 135.730 173.991 -66.698 1382.721
i02 212.534 3361.213 2374.859 4152.762 -814.439 9286.929
i03 266.893 1821.135 6353.325 15198.947 62.740 23703.039
a01 331.079 985.196 4337.191
a02 192.618 1700.987 8423.217    
a03 212.366    
TZ 63.550 382.382 2078.717
Z 1382.721 9286.929 23703.039
 
r03 i01 i02 i03 C E-M Z 
i01 179.535 1354.596 316.076 525.869 388.729 2764.805
i02 347.772 5399.876 3359.112 5726.046 -654.896 14177.910
i03 403.101 2639.516 8063.168 15277.397 274.797 26657.980
a01 808.035 1611.618 6401.402
a02 457.152 1811.149 5893.926    
a03 506.249    
TZ 62.961 1361.155 2624.295
Z 2764.805 14177.910 26657.980
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Table A2. Trade Flows at Producer Prices (US$ Billion) 
 
r01 r02 r03 E (Exports) 
r01 
i01 1896.718 9.266 23.241 1929.225
i02 11155.367 832.722 940.402 12928.492
i03 14794.680 119.303 265.180 15179.163
r02 
i01 84.147 1228.837 69.737 1382.721
i02 334.180 8509.764 442.986 9286.929
i03 137.497 23259.293 260.129 23656.919
r03 
i01 406.156 179.933 2178.717 2764.805
i02 521.219 549.062 13107.629 14177.910
i03 238.113 261.703 25857.829 26357.644
M (Imports) 
i01 2387.021 1418.035 2271.694  
i02 12010.766 9891.548 14491.016  
i03 15170.290 23640.300 26383.137  
 
 
Table A3. Trade Flows at FOB Prices (US$ Billion) 
 
r01 r02 r03 E (Exports) 
r01 
i01 1898.548 9.348 23.359 1931.255
i02 11172.883 858.921 966.300 12998.104
i03 14794.680 119.303 265.180 15179.163
r02 
i01 84.479 1228.897 69.896 1383.272
i02 335.754 8513.442 445.493 9294.689
i03 137.497 23259.293 260.129 23656.919
r03 
i01 411.791 182.415 2226.328 2820.534
i02 522.836 551.304 13119.400 14193.539
i03 238.113 261.703 25857.829 26357.644
M (Imports) 
i01 2394.818 1420.660 2319.583  
i02 12031.473 9923.666 14531.193  
i03 15170.290 23640.300 26383.137  
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Table A4. Trade Flows at CIF Prices (US$ Billion) 
 
r01 r02 r03 E (Exports) 
r01 
i01 1922.097 10.254 26.918 1959.268
i02 11242.964 897.872 1015.088 13155.924
i03 14794.680 119.303 265.180 15179.163
r02 
i01 111.657 1246.610 80.100 1438.367
i02 348.959 8569.366 457.372 9375.697
i03 137.497 23259.293 260.129 23656.919
r03 
i01 431.406 190.235 2260.533 2882.174
i02 544.514 572.019 13235.434 14351.967
i03 238.113 261.703 25857.829 26357.644
M (Imports) 
i01 2465.159 1447.099 2367.551  
i02 12136.437 10039.257 14707.894  
i03 15170.290 23640.300 26383.137  
 
 
Table A5. Trade Flows at Tariff Inclusive Market Prices (US$ Billion) 
 
r01 r02 r03 E (Exports) 
r01 
i01 1927.432 10.421 27.801 1965.654
i02 11319.359 930.651 1070.935 13320.945
i03 14794.682 119.303 265.180 15179.164
r02 
i01 115.804 1248.148 82.329 1446.280
i02 363.189 8583.972 475.129 9422.291
i03 137.497 23259.293 260.129 23656.920
r03 
i01 442.951 190.850 2265.947 2899.748
i02 576.595 586.745 13286.741 14450.081
i03 238.113 261.703 25857.874 26357.690
M (Imports) 
i01 2486.188 1449.418 2376.076  
i02 12259.143 10101.369 14832.805  
i03 15170.292 23640.300 26383.183  
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Table A6. Inter-regional Shipping Supply (US$ Billion) 
 
r01 r02 r03 
195.549 46.120 300.335 
 
 
Table A7. Substitution Elasticities 
 
ߪ௝௓ ߪ௝௒ ߪ௝௑ ߪ௜்  
i01 0.85 0.70 0.75 5.00 
i02 0.90 1.20 0.80 4.00 
i03 0.90 1.50 0.80 2.00 
 
 
Table A8. Proportion of Inactive Firms (ࡳ࢙࢘ሺ࢘ୀ࢙ሻ) 
 
r01 r02 r03 
0.40 0.40 0.40 
 
 
Table A9. Other Data 
 
ߛ ߝ 
5.00 0.60 
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Table A10. Social Accounting Matrices for Each Region 
 
r01 Expenditures: Activities  Commodities  Factors  Institutions Trade Total 
Receipts: AT01 AT02 AT03 CT01 CT02 CT03 VA01 VA02 VA03 FM HH WT IS TT 
Activities AT01  0  -2.031 1931.255 1929.255 
 AT02  0  -69.612 12998.104 12928.492 
AT03  0  0 15179.163 195.549 15374.712 
Commodities CT01 202.512 1525.609 267.368  490.699 2486.188 
 CT02 311.001 6363.255 2506.497  3078.391 12259.143 
CT03 243.280 2001.736 4237989  8687.287 15170.292 
Factors VA01 344.683 1312.111 3664.479  5321.273 
 VA02 562.766 1372.319 4035.730  5970.815 
VA03 450.048  450.048 
Institutions FM  5321.273 5321.273 
HH -185.066 353.461 662.650 21.028 122.706 0.002  5970.815 450.048 5321.273 -511.941 -20.244 12184.733 
Trade WT  2394.818 12031.473 15170.290  29596.581 
IS  70.341 104.964 0  175.305 
Total TT 1929.225 12928.492 15374.712 2486.188 12259.143 15170.292 5321.273 5970.815 450.048 532.273 12184.733 29596.581 175.305  
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r02 Expenditures: Activities  Commodities  Factors  Institutions Trade Total 
Receipts: AT01 AT02 AT03 CT01 CT02 CT03 VA01 VA02 VA03 FM HH WT IS TT 
Activities AT01  0  -0.551 1383.272 1382.721 
 AT02  0  -7.760 9294.689 9286.929 
AT03  0  0 23656.919 46.120 23703.039 
Commodities CT01 103.680 1036.017 135.730  173.991 1449.418 
 CT02 212.534 3361.213 2374.859  4152.762 10101.369 
CT03 266.893 1821.135 6353.325  15198.947 23640.300 
Factors VA01 331.079 985.196 4337.191  5653.465 
 VA02 192.618 1700.987 8423.217  10316.822 
VA03 212.366  212.366 
Institutions FM  5653.465 5653.465 
HH 63.550 382.382 2078.717 2.319 62.112 0  10316.822 212.366 5653.465 649.746 95.909 19517.389 
Trade WT  1420.660 9923.666 23640.300  34984.626 
IS  26.439 115.590 0  142.029 
Total TT 1382.721 9286.929 23703.039 1449.418 10101.369 23640.300 5653.465 10316.822 212.366 5653.465 19517.389 34984.626 142.029  
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r03 Expenditures: Activities  Commodities  Factors  Institutions Trade Total 
Receipts: AT01 AT02 AT03 CT01 CT02 CT03 VA01 VA02 VA03 FM HH WT IS TT 
Activities AT01  0  -55.729 2820.534 2764.805 
 AT02  0  -15.630 14193.539 14177.910 
AT03  0  0 26357.644 300.335 26657.980 
Commodities CT01 179.535 1354.596 316.076  525.869 2376.076 
 CT02 347.772 5399.876 3359.112  5726.046 14832.805 
CT03 403.101 2639.516 8063.168  15277.397 26383.183 
Factors VA01 808.035 1611.618 6401.402  8821.055 
 VA02 457.152 1811.149 5893.926  8162.227 
VA03 506.249  506.249 
Institutions FM  8821.055 8821.055 
HH 62.961 1361.155 2624.295 8.526 124.911 0.046  8162.227 506.249 8821.055 -137.805 -75.666 21457.954 
Trade WT  2319.583 14531.193 26383.137  43233.913 
IS  47.968 176.702 0  224.670 
Total TT 2764.805 14177.910 36657.980 2376.076 14832.805 26383.183 8821.055 8162.227 506.249 8821.055 21457.954 43233.913 224.670  
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Table A11. Global Input-Output Table (US$ Billion) 
 
Activity  r01 r02 r03  C ISS Trade Cost Z 
Commodity i01 i02 i03 i01 i02 i03 i01 i02 i03 r01 r02 r03 (-) TT 
i01 191.619 1058.130 204.212 0.200 9.107 0.524 1.074 18.855 4.310 473.471 0.589 3.561 -36.429 1929.225 
r01 i02 293.012 5858.648 2351.912 16.589 315.806 168.980 29.615 402.572 217.052 2815.787 429.276 421.696 -392.453 12928.492 
i03 236.890 1948.167 4058.886 2.237 10.465 79.404 6.079 31.340 121.283 8550.739 27.197 106.477 195.549 -0.002 15374.712 
i01 2.258 96.886 13.089 99.813 860.126 125.601 3.181 55.838 12.763 3.570 162.608 10.547 -63.560 1382.721 
r02 i02 6.952 195.010 59.741 185.486 2846.301 2099.343 13.139 178.604 96.297 101.486 3452.842 187.089 -135.361 9286.929 
i03 2.339 19.609 65.563 259.748 1787.714 6099.741 5.963 30.743 118.973 49.985 15112.091 104.449 46.120 -0.000 23703.039 
i01 8.636 370.593 50.066 3.667 166.785 9.605 175.280 1279.903 299.003 13.657 10.793 511.761 -134.943 2764.805 
r03 i02 11.037 309.596 94.844 10.459 199.105 106.536 305.017 4818.700 3045.763 161.118 270.645 5117.260 -272.172 14177.910 
i03 4.051 33.959 113.540 4.908 22.956 174.180 391.059 2577.432 7822.912 86.563 59.659 15066.471 300.335 -0.046 26657.980 
a01 344.683 1312.111 3664.479 331.079 985.196 4337.191 808.035 1611.618 6401.402  
V a02 562.766 1372.319 4035.730 192.618 1700.987 8423.217 457.152 1822.149 5893.926  
a03 450.048  212.366 506.249   
TZ -185.066 353.461 662.650 63.550 382.382 2078.717 62.961 1361.155 2624.295  
Z 1929.225 12928.492 15374.712 1382.721 9286.929 23703.039 2764.805 14177.910 26657.980  
 
